Abstract: This paper investigates the warfare command game problem on both sides with force resource complementary in the fixed time. Under some moderate assumptions, force resource complementary differential game is proposed,which ensures that the optimal strategies are obtained based on Lanchester square law equation, and the optimum conditions are given by the quantitative analysis. In analyzing and solving the optimal strategies of an numerical example, feasibility and effectiveness of the model and the approach is demonstrated. The research results may provide a theoretical reference for combat command decision making and games.
INTRODUCTION
Lanchester theory of combat (Taylor, 1983; Ekchian, 1982; Helmbold, 1975 ) is a typical scientific method to predict the outcome of military battles by the quantitative analysis. Lanchester equation theory has been widely used to analyze real wars and determine tactics in war game simulation. In the last few years, Some warfare command decision making and game problems (Li, 2000; Sha, 2003) based on Lanchester equation have been an active area of considerable research. On these problems, there are some related results recently. The optimal resource allocation and redistribution models in military conflicts based on Lanchester square law equation is proposed in Sheeba and Ghose (2006; 2008) and Ghose(2002) etal. A mathematical model to solve the maximum remaining force problem when the total force is not superior to the enemy is proposed in Chen and Jing, etal. (2009) . Mathematic tactics to research the military problems and the firepowerassignment differential game models are researched in Sha, (2003) . Differential game model to analyze the firepowerassignment problem of backhanded sight gunshot is established and its solutions are solved according to Lanchester's second linear law in Huang and Xu (2006) . Lanchester square law equation model extended to a (2, 2) conflict is proposed in Colegrave and Hyde (1993) . With the complexity of the warfare command systems, the warfare command decision making and game problems with the additional battle factors have been the focus of major ⋆ This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (grants 60774097) and Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(grant N100604019) of P.R. China, by Ministry of Education and Science of the R. Macedonia (grant 14-3154/1-17.12.2007) , and by Dogus University Fund for Science.
research interests in recent years. Firepower-assignment optimization model in information war using Lanchester theory and differential games theory is investigated in Li and Sun (2008) . A class of troops support differential game models and gave the optimal strategies of troops support is proposed in Li and Chen (2004) . Two-player zero-sum differential game in which the players have the asymmetric information on the random terminal payoff is researched in Cardaliaguet (2007; 2008) .
However, most of research results are obtained by considering the outcome of the battle in the termination time of the battle, that is, the operational side is eliminated or the enemy side is eliminated. For the research on the change of the force strengths on both sides in the fixed time, there are a few related results. Thus, our purposed in this paper, then, is to investigate the warfare command decision making problem based on the Lanchester square law equation with force resource complementary in the fixed time. We establish the differential game model and its solution for the force resource complementary and give the optimum conditions, and the corresponding optimal strategies are analyzed quantitatively. Numerical example is also proposed to show the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed model and the approach. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the differential game problem formulation with force resource complementary in military conflict. In Section 3, we propose the optimum conditions and the solving approach of the optimal strategies. After that, in section 4, The optimal strategies is obtained by an application example presented to show the effectiveness of the model and the approach. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude the paper, summarize the results obtained, and lay out some possible directions for future research.
DIFFERENTIAL GAME PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider the following Lanchester square law equation with force resource complementary is described as ẋ(t) = −αy(t) + u(t), x(t 0 ) = x 0 y(t) = −βx(t) + v(t), y(t 0 ) = y 0
where x(t) and y(t) are the strengths of two opposing forces surviving at the time t. α > 0 and β > 0 are the constant attrition coefficients that reflect the effectiveness of forces in the unit time. x(t 0 ) = x 0 and y(t 0 ) = y 0 are considered as the initial force strengths of two military forces. u(t) > 0 and v(t) > 0 are the control input variables.
Remark 1. u(t) and v(t) are the control inputs in some warfare command decision making problems, which can change the battle situation and the force strengths of two opposing forces. At present, many researchers consider the reinforcement factor and the self-destroying factor as the control inputs.
Now, consider a military conflict between two opposing forces. Let Y denote the defending side and X denote the attacking side, and consider u and v as the rate of the reinforcement on both sides. We address the optimization problem for determining the optimal reinforcement strategies u * and v * to satisfy an object function J(u, v), which consists of the surviving force strengths of two opposing forces in the fixed time T .
where x(T ) and y(T ) are the residual of force strengths on both sides in the fixed time T .
The objective of this paper is to solve the optimal reinforcement strategies for system (1) and the object function J(u, v). To continue our solving process, the following assumption is needed for the above decision making problem.
Assumption 1. According to the index performance, suppose that u > 0 and v > 0 satisfy
where u 1 is the minimum rate of force strengths complementary of x , u 2 is the maximum rate of force strengths complementary of x; v 1 is the minimum rate of force strengths complementary of y, v 2 is the maximum rate of force strengths complementary of y.
Assumption 2. Denote that X 0 and Y 0 are the total of the force strengths complementary of two military forces, the following conditions are satisfied.
Remark 2. the inequities (5) and (6) represent the limit of the force strengths complementary on both sides, that is, the strategies can not been kept with the maximum complementary rater u 2 and v 2 from 0 to T.
Then, the game problem can be described as follows. the attacking side x(t) will to get the optimal strategy u * to get the maximum value of J(u, v), the enemy side y(t) will get the optimal strategy v * to get the minimum value of J (u, v) , that is,
3. THE OPTIMUM CONDITION AND THE SOLVING APPROACH
The objective of this paper is to get the optimal strategies of the differential game, that is, we should get the optimal value of J(u, v). Thus, we can give the optimum conditions and the solving approach about the force strengths complementary strategies in this section.
Firstly, we can get the solutions of (1) as follows
By using the solution of (1), the index performance J(u, v) can be presented as
where
With the constant numbers x 0 , y 0 and T , we can solve the optimal value of the index performance (8) by researching the optimal value of the index performance (9) as follows,
Lemma 1 (Li and Chen, 2004) . If there exist the constant numbers λ > 0 and µ > 0 , and the force strengths complementary rates u
then, the index performance (9) satisfies
If there exist the constant λ > 0 and µ > 0 , and the force strengths complementary rates u
that is, u * (t) and v * (t) can be considered as the optimal strategies of the differential game.
Proof: Firstly, we can construct the Lagrange function as follows,
According to the above equation, we can find that L(u, v, λ, µ, t) is the separable function, then, we can discuss the warfare strategies u and v to research the optimal value of J(u, v), respectively. a) when ∆ 2 > λ, we can get that
From the equation (15), for the differential game, it is deduced that when the strategy satisfies u * = u 2 , we can obtain the optimal value of L(u, v, λ, µ, t) satisfies
Otherwise, we can assume that there exists the optimal strategy u m (u 1 < u m < u 2 ) such that
Then,the assumption is not hold, that is,
b) According to a), we can also get that when ∆ 2 < λ, the optimal force strengths complementary rates is u 1 . It satisfies
c) when ∆ 3 > µ, we can get
From the above equation, for the differential game, it is deduced that when the optimal strategy satisfy v * = v 2 , the optimal value of L(u * , v * , λ, µ, t) satisfy that
Otherwise, we can suppose that there exists the optimal
Then, the assumption is not hold, that is,
d) According to c), we can get that when ∆ 3 < µ, the optimal force strengths complementary rate is v 1 , where
Then, we can solve the integral of (15) and (16) from 0 to T , and get
By Lemma 1, we know that
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and we also get that
then, Theorem 1 is proved.
According to Theorem 1, the optimal reinforcement strategies u * (t) and v * (t) on both sides can be solved as follows,
Let ∆ 2 = λ, one gets
Similarly, let ∆ 3 = µ, then t µ can be obtained as
Then the optimal strategies (19) can be written as follows,
and the objective function satisfies
That is, u * (t) and v * (t) are the optimal strategies of the optimization model.
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE AND DISCUSSION
Consider the differential game (1)-(6), and suppose that x 0 = 1000, y 0 = 1000, T = 3, α = 0.4, β = 0.9, u 1 = 25, u 2 = 50, v 1 = 20, v 2 = 40, X 0 = 100, Y 0 = 100. Then, the conditions (2), (4), (5)and (6) are satisfied, and we will solve the optimal value of x(T ) − y(T ) to get the optimal strategies u * and v * .
According to Theorem 1 , the optimal strategies u * and v * can be solved as follows, where t λ = 0.9667 and t µ = 1.9426. And we can get that λ = 4.1600, µ = 1.6600, Fig. 1 . the change of force strengths on both sides with the optimal strategies of troops support u * and v * Table 1 . the solutions of the differential game when T = 3, 4, 5, 10 and v * . It can be observed that there exists the different strategies in the different intervals, and the feasibility can be validated.
In order to illustrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the solving method and the model proposed in this paper, we can obtain the solutions of the differential game by setting the differential parameters u and v, which is shown in Table. 1. Then, it can be observed that the strategies is feasible in the above confidence intervals.
CONCLUSIONS
What should be emphasized is that this work seems to be the important investigation on the warfare command decision making problem with force strengths complementary. We establish the troops support differential game model and the optimum conditions. The optimal strategies of troops support are obtained with a numerical example. the computation results are given to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the model and the solving approach researched in this paper.
There are still some related problems to be investigated. For example, how to construct the warfare command decision making and game problems by considering the additional battle factors? such as, information war, and self-destroying factor. How to propose the better approach to solve the differential game model based on Lanchester square law equation in order to decrease the calculation error? How to construct the generalized decision making or game model also is an important deserving consideration.
